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LICENSING INTERSTATE VEHICLES:
STATE COOPERATION OR FEDERAL INTERVENTION?.
JESS N. ROSENBERG*

Roads have been an essential part of transportation since man
began to travel and to take his goods with him. This fact is sometimes
obscured by the intense current preoccupation with motor vehicles
which are often regarded as the cause of roads rather than instruments
for utilization of roads. In any event, it is true that, with the advent
of the motor vehicle, highways have become an increasingly important part of the nation's transportation system. That this tendency
and importance will continue and even be accelerated is portended by
the creation of the National System of Interstate and Defense Highways' and the state road programs now being undertaken in connection therewith. Under these circumstances it is certain that the
interstate movement of persons and goods by motor vehicle will be
expanded far beyond present activity and that licensing of interstate
commercial vehicles and procedures to accommodate free movement
of such vehicles will receive more attention from state governments'as
developments progress.
In the words of the Federal Highway Administrator, the problem of
the states is the reconciliation of two "praiseworthy" objectives:
"First, that of insuring the free movement of vehicles in interstate
commerce; and second, that of requiring that all vehicles traveling in
the state pay their due shares of user taxes for the support of the
state's roads and streets."'2 He has also expressed the thought that
''an increasing awareness of the federal road-user taxes will bring
about a trend toward somewhat greater uniformity in states' schedules." 3 He further indicates that, the federal government having become "a very active partner in the taxation of interstate movements,"
controversies which now exist at the state level concerning taxation
and reciprocity of vehicles moving in interstate commerce may be
abated; that the congressional action directing highway tax studies.
should "spur" the states toward greater uniformity and settlement
4
of interstate highway tax difficulties.
These statements leave little doubt that, at the federal level, definite
consideration is being given to the possibility of intervention by the
* General Counsel, Western Highway Institute. Member, Washington State
Bar.
1. 70 Stat. 378, 381 (1956), 23 U.S.C. § 157 (1956, Supp. 1957).

2. H.R. Doc. No. 106, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1957).
3. Ibid.
4. Id. at 61.
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national government in the event that the states fail to deal adequately with the interstate vehicle problem.
In the past, states have attempted to meet this problem of interstate vehicle movement by granting reciprocal exemptions from licensing requirements.5 Recent developments among various groups
of states would seem to indicate that there is considerable doubt as
to the adequacy of "simple" reciprocity in the light of the great increase in interstate commercial vehicle use.
The principle of reciprocity, under which a vehicle properly licensed
in its home state may travel in all other states without the payment
of any additional license charge, has received general acceptance
throughout the nation. It is now applied universally with respect
to private passenger automobiles. The principle is also generally accepted with respect to commercial vehicles but its application has
been severely restricted in many states for several reasons that deserve consideration:
(1) Residence of the owner of a commercial vehicle is not always
readily ascertainable, nor is residence of a business owner always
the place where the vehicle is principally used. Ownership determination of commercial vehicles for licensing purposes is further complicated by the common practice of leased operations of great variety.
(2) The pattern of commercial vehicle taxation varies so widely
that it is difficult to establish a mutual exchange of benefits which are
actual reciprocals, each of the other, between any two given states.
(3) The great number and differing nature of governmental agencies administering commercial vehicle tax, regulatory and reciprocity
laws immensely complicate the task of achieving mutuality.
The enumerated considerations encompass for the most part the
areas within which conflicts among the states have arisen. Generally,
the states have attempted to solve difficulties concerning reciprocity
by various bilateral agreements or informal understandings. These
arrangements have been reasonably satisfactory in the past.6 The
complicating factors listed above, however, when added to the tremendous increase in all types of commercial vehicles since World
5. RECIPROCITY COMM., AMERICAN Ass'N. OF MOTOR VEHICLE ADMINIsTRATORs,
STATE MOTOR VEHICLE REGULATION AND TAXATION AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE

NON-RESIDENT (1947).

6. A number of "barrier" studies have been published, however, which consider vehicle and carrier taxes along with many other types of barriers. Some
outstanding examples are:

(1) Truitt, Interstate Trade Barriersin the United States, 8 LAW & CONTEMP.

PROB. 209 (1941). (This article is included as one in a symposium on governmental marketing barriers.)
(2) U. S. BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE, INTER-

STATE BARRIERS TO TRUCK TRANSPORTATION (1950).
(3) UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA, BARRIERS TO THE INTERSTATE MOVEMENT OF
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS BY MOTOR VEHICLE IN THE ELEVEN WESTERN STATES

(1953).
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War II and the pressures for accelerated highway financing, have
placed this type of reciprocity structure under increasing strain. Disparity in types of laws and also with respect to dollar levels of tax
payments have added further stress.
In the years during and following the war, attention of officials at
various levels of government has been increasingly directed toward
possible solutions and they have been joined in this effort by various
highway user organizations." All of this activity can be characterized
as attempts to insure the free flow of commerce while insuring the
payment of a "fair share" to the states. It thus becomes evident that
the problem of interstate vehicle taxation is no different from the
problems encountered in taxation of other interstate property or industrial activity. It is pertinent, therefore, in dealing with taxation
of interstate vehicles and reciprocity, to examine consideration previously given to this very basic problem of constitutional law.
The commerce clause 8 authorizes Congress to regulate commerce
"among the several states." This authorization, even in the absence
of action by Congress, has been held to act as a proscription on the
taxing power of the states.9 Thus, in the absence of congressional
rules, and as a practical matter, the standards by which the legal
validity of state taxes on interstate commerce may be determined are
established by decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Inasmuch as the personnel of the court, the economic aspects of interstate
commerce and the opinions of the Court change from time to time, the
legal rules applicable to taxation of interstate commerce have also
changed from time to time.10 Under these circumstances and in the
7. (a) Interstate Trade Barriers Affecting Motor Vehicle Transportation,

S. Doc. No. 81, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. (1944).
(b) See note 5 supra.
(c) Proceedings, 20th Annual Conference of American Motor Vehicle
Administrators (1952).
(d)COM1ITTEE ON HIGHWAY USE TAxEs, 20TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE, NATIONAL Ass'N. OF TAX ADMINISTRATORS, A PRACTICAL PROGRAM
TAXATION OF INTERSTATE HIGHWAY USE (1952).

TO IMPROVE

(e)AMEmcAN TRUCKING ASS'NS., INC., TAXATION OF INTERSTATE TRUCKS, THE
POSITION, POLICIES AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TRUCKING INDUSTRY (1954).
(f) Resolution adopted by the National Governors' Conference (1954):

(g)

"It is the position of the Governors' Conference that some type of
working agreement among the states must be developed, whether by
uniform legislation, interstate compact, or otherwise, which will preserve the right of each state to devise its own tax system to meet its
highway finance needs and, at the same time provide a cooperative
method of allocating the taxation of heavy commercial vehicles traveling interstate." PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE (1954).

RESEARCH DEPT., NATIONAL HIGHWAY USERS CONFERENCE, THE FREE FLOW

OF INTERSTATE TRAFFIC AND MOTOR VEHICLE RECIPROCITY (1957).

8. U. S. CONST., art. I, § 8.

9. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946).
10. An interesting discussion of the effect of court shifts in this field is to
be found in Lockhart, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transportationand

Communication, 57 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1943). See also Rosenberg, Future of
Gross Receipts Taxes, REVENUE ADMINISTRATION NATIONAL ASS'N. OF TAX
ADMINISTRATORS (1947).
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absence of any undertaking by the Congress to set forth the appropri-ate rules by legislative act, the states and interstate taxpayers must
:proceed under court announced rules, subject at all times to review
-and possible reinterpretation.
,So much has been written, both in decisions and commentary, on the
-subject of state taxation of interstate commerce that to here attempt
exhaustive treatment would be both impossible and pointless.' Review -of a few central points may be helpful, however, in outlining
the present status of state tax power vis-a-vis interstate motor
vehicles.
From the initial premise established by the Court, that states may
not unduly burden interstate commerce, we find that numerous decisions have resolved this holding into various corollary formulations.
These are the court-made rules which today govern the validity of
state taxes as they affect interstate commerce:12
(a) A state may not single out interstate commerce for a special
tax burden.
(b) A state may not discriminate against interstate commerce and
in favor of its local trade.
(c) A state may not impose a tax which exposes interstate commerce to the actuality or risk of a total burden, by that state and
other states which is cumulative, discriminatory or special.13
Inasmuch as we are here concerned with highway user taxes, it
should next be recognized that, while the rules just reviewed have
been fully applicable to cases concerning the taxing power of the
states, such application has been limited where the regulatory power
or the police power of the states has been questioned. In such cases,
the United States Supreme Court has seemed to consider the state
authority to be "concurrent" authority as distinguished from Con14
gress's "exclusive" authority in the taxation field.
It may be surmised that this dichotomy reflects a judicial view that
purely fiscal burdens can be evaluated in judicial proceedings whereas
police or regulatory policies affect states internally in many complex
ways not likely to be fully explored in the record of a single case.
In any event, there has been a clear indication that the present Court
11. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1953) is an outstanding compendium in this field.
12. Lockhart, op. cit. supra note 10, at 95; Brabson, Multistate Taxation of
the Transportation Industry, 18 OHIo ST. L.J. 22, 24 (1957). Any attempt at
simplification or generalization with respect to the plethora of decisions in this
field is useless for any purpose except perspective. The statement above
represents the author's perspective.
13. A nice statement of some practical considerations to be weighed by the
court in such cases is presented by Justice Rutledge in his special concurring
opinion, International Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 349
(1944).
14. Hartman, op. cit. supra note 11, at 260.
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considers that the states can do much more that affects or constricts
the flow of interstate commerce under their regulatory or police
powers than under the taxing power. 15
Taxation of commercial vehicles moving in interstate commerce
has been under consideration by the United States Supreme Court
on a number of occasions. A most significant analysis and review of
the cases is to be found in Justice Frankfurter's exhaustive dissent in
Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice16 to which he has appended a
chronological chart of fifteen principal previous decisions, furnishing
17
a convenient history of the law on this subject.
15. "A police regulation of local aspects of interstate commerce is a power
often essential to a State in safeguarding vital local interests. At least until
Congress chooses to enact a nation-wide rule, the power will not be denied
to the State." Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946).
16. 339 U.S. 542, 548 (1950).
17. Id. at 561. The author's analysis of the 15 principal decisions discussed
is offered for those who may be interested in this field:
Case #1, Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915), held that a state
might charge persons engaged in interstate commerce for road use so long
as such charges were reasonable and were fixed according to some uniform,
fair and practical standard, since, if they met this standard there would be
no burden on interstate commerce.
Case #2, Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916), held valid a charge
similar to that in Case #1 even though it imposed a full annual fee on a
non-resident driving through the state in one day and even though the
fees collected might result in a surplus over regulation and inspection
expense.
Case #3, Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554 (1927), represents the extension of
Cases #1 and #2 to common carriers. Part of the carrier's case against the
tax was that a sum in addition to the license fee was charged for highway
use but was not entirely used therefor. The Court upheld the tax and
said that, if the tax was assessed for a proper purpose, the use to which
the proceeds were put was immaterial.
Case #4, Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245 (1928), dealt
with
a tax of but
a cent
a mile
proceeds
go to highway
maintenance,
levied
onlyfor
on highway
interstateuse,
carriers.
A to
different
tax was
exemption
gave
which
gross,
of
(3%
operators
on intrastate
assessed
from
2%the
netcontention
which interstate
carriers
had to pay).
The law
was upheld
against
that it was
an attempt
to regulate
interstate
commerce or at least to discriminate against it. The court held that factual
proof
a disproportionate
economic burden
not made,
nor wasand
it
shown ofthat
no reasonable relationship
existedwas
between
the charge
the value of the privilege granted. (No clue was given as to the type of
proof necessary.)
#5, Sprout
v. South
Bend, as
277applied
U.S. 163to (1928),
held invalid
a seat
feeCase
ordinance
on for
hire busses
an interstate
carrier
for
the reason that the charge was unrelated to the cost incurred or value
of
use offor
streets
there was no
requirement that the funds were to be
applied
streetand
maintenance
or construction.
Case #6, Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183 (1931), involved a fiat fee on interstate busses which was held invalid because it was
not shown to be levied only for use of highways (authority of Case #4)
nor the proceeds allocated for highway purposes (authority of Case #3).
The court further pointed out that there was no relationship between the
tax formula and the degree of use.
Case #57, Continental Baking Co. v. Wooding, 286 U.S. 352 (1932),
sustained a gross-ton mile assessment on a private carrier moving i
interstate commerce on the theory that there was a relationship between
the levy and the use.
Case #8, Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U.S. 169 (1933), resulted in a fing
of
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Analysis of this. decision and the cases discussed and reviewed by
both majority and dissenting opinions makes it apparent that in
such "regulatory" cases the Court is at present limiting its decisions
because it believes Congress, not the Court, should make the rules.
The unmistakable implication is that Congress can get better over-all
validity for a license tax on private contract carriers graduated by truck
size and weight on the presumption the charge was for use of the roads.
Case #9, Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Comm'n.,
295 U.S. 285 (1935), held that a moderate license fee of the same amount
from all carriers for upkeep of highways regardless of the extent of the
actual use was proper. It was said that all received the same privilege and
if the carrier didn't use it as much as others that was his own business.
Case #10, Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407 (1936), found the court holding that a caravan licensee could not complain if the fees collected from
him were not allocated to highways.
Case #11, Ingels v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290 (1937), found that a caravan
fee was so far in excess of cost of facilities of regulation that interstate
commerce was unduly burdened.
Case #12, Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Comn'r, 306 U.S.
72 (1939), embraced a challenge on the grounds that the interstate
carrier did not use the roads toward the upkeep of which the taxes were
expended. The court found that it was immaterial how the state chose to
use the proceeds.
Case #13, Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939), considered another caravan statute and found the classification reasonable and the fee
not disproportionate to cost of administration and policing.
Case #14, McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176 (1940),
rejected a gasoline tax on all fuel in the tank of an interstate bus because it
bore no relationship to use of the highways in the taxing state.
Case #15, Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Comm'rs,
332 U.S. 495 (1957), upheld a tax on an interstate carrier for use of
highways despite the fact that the proceeds therefrom were not specifically
allocated for such purpose. The charge is for the privilege, not the use
and it is immaterial what use the state makes of the proceeds.
The decision which evoked this extensive reexamination of taxes on
interstate carriers involved a tax based on percentage of value of the
vehicle which became due, not annually, but at the time of first registration and upon each subsequent transfer of title. The majority refused to
evaluate the relationship of the tax incidence to the objective to be obtained thereby, casting the burden of such examination upon Congress.
It pointed out that the Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. § 302(b) contained a declaration by Congress that nothing in that act was to be
construed as affecting state tax powers and noted that carriers under
the act were required to keep accounts of state taxes for road use. Presumably, the court posits congressional awareness of the situation and
feels that Congress has both command of the facts and the constitutional
power to regulate.
The chief point of the dissent was that "Reason precludes the notion
that a tax for a privilege may disregard the absence of a 'nexus' between
privilege and tax." The dissenters pointed out that in no prior case had
the court upheld a tax formula bearing no reasonable relationship to the
privilege of road use and emphasized that not only was the tax base
irrelevant but the incidence (time of titling) also lacked relevance to
privilege of use.
After criticizing the obvious effect of the majority opinion in reducing
the ground of challenge to unreasonableness of amount, only, the dissent
directs a most compelling argument to both Congress and state tax
authorities:
"... . So long as a State bases its tax on a relevant measure of actual

road use, obviously both interstate and intrastate carriers pay according
to the facilities in fact provided by the State. But a tax levied for the
privilege of using roads, and not their actual use, may, in the normal
course of operations and not as a financial hypothesis, involve an undue
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information through its investigatory processes for the purpose of
"making rules" than the Court can get by way of evidence in a
single proceeding.
This general view has been frankly stated by the Court:
Courts are not possessed of instruments of determination so delicate
as to enable them to weigh the various factors in a complicated economic
setting which, as to an isolated application of a State tax, might mitigate
18
the obvious burden generally created by a direct tax on commerce.
The basis on which this
in a dissent in an earlier
tax applied to interstate
was unquestioned but the

view rests was set forth with forceful clarity
case which had held unconstitutional a fuel
motor carriers. The impropriety of the tax
dissenters stated:

Our disagreement with the opinion (majority opinion invalidating the
tax) just announced does not arise from a belief that Federal action
is unnecessary to bring about appropriate uniformity in regulations of
interstate commerce. Indeed, state legislation before this Court indicates
quite the contrary....

Judicial control of national commerce-unlike legislative regulationsburden on interstate carriers. While the privilege extended by a State
is unlimited in form, and thus theoretically the same for all vehicles,
whether interstate or intrastate, the intrastate vehicle can and will exercise the privilege whenever it is in operation, while the interstate
vehicle must necessarily forego the privilege some of the time simply
because of its interstate character, i.e., because it operates in other states
as well. In the general average of instances, the privilege is not as
valuable to the interstate as to the intrastate carrier. And because it
operates in other states there is danger-and not a fanciful danger-that
the interstate carrier will be subject to the privilege taxes of several
states, even though his entire use of the highways is not significantly
of intrastate operators who are subject to only one
greater than that
4
privilege tax."
(Note #4: "These dangers are heightened when the tax falls upon an
interstate motor carrier authorized to operate only on a fixed route.
Quite illustrative of the seriousness of the general problem are the
facts concerning one of appellants here, Capitol Greyhound Lines,
which is authorized by the ICC to operate a bus line over a fixed route
between Cincinnati, Ohio and Washington, D.C., a distance of about
496 miles, only nine of which are over Maryland's State roads. To
say that Capitol has an unlimited privilege to use Maryland's roads
and is therefore being treated on a par with intrastate carriers
is to ignore the admonition that 'Regulation and commerce among the
I
States both are practical rather than technical conceptions ....
Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217,
225." Id. at 557.)
The dilemma in which the interstate motor carrier may find itself in
respect to state and local taxes is outlined in editorial comment on the
principal case in 17 A.L.R. 2d 407, 432 (1951). The body of decisions, it
is pointed out, leave the carrier with "practically nothing to go on" in
attempting to show excessive charge for highway use.
It is also interesting to note the further editorial comment ascribing
policy motivation in such decisions to pressure of argument in support
of railroads. The comment has received added significance through the
recent decision of a United States District Court in Pennsylvania. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern Railroad President's Conference, 155 F.
Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
18. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946).
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must from inherent limitations of the judicial process treat the subject
by the hit-and-miss method of deciding single local controversies upon
evidence and information limited by the narrow rules of litigation.
Spasmodic and unrelated instances of litigation cannot afford an adequate
basis for the creation of integrated national rules which alone can afford
the full protection for interstate commerce intended by the Constitution.
We would, therefore, leave the questions raised by the Arkansas tax for
the consideration of Congress in a nation-wide survey of the constantly increasing barriers to trade among the States. Unconfined by 'the narrow
scope of judicial proceedings' Congress alone can, in the exercise of its
plenary constitutional control over interstate commerce, not only consider whether such a tax as now under scrutiny is consistent with the best
interest of our national economy, but can also on the basis of full exploration of the many aspects of a complicated problem devise a national policy fair alike to the States and to our Union. Diverse and
interacting state laws may well have created avoidable hardships.... But
the remedy, if any is called for, we think is within the ample reach of
Congress.19
Inasmuch as the author of this dissent has consistently maintained
this viewpoint and, in 1950, announced the same view for the majority in Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice,20 this earlier dissent may
be considered to have compelling force today. It may be assumed
that where many complicated factors, extrinsic to the litigation, are
to be evaluated, the Court believes that Congress should make the

rules.
The decisions make it clear that there is a need for uniform rules
or standards for determining the validity of state tax laws in this
field and that the Court is reluctant to formulate them. If, however,
the Court continues to wait on the Congress while Congress continues, seemingly, to ignore what the Court has said, automatic im21
provement of the situation can hardly be expected.
19. McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176, 185-88 (1940).
(Emphasis added).
20. 339 U.S. 542 (1950).
21. A 1944 report of the Board of Investigation and Research, in considering
legal and practical aspects of trade barriers, stated: "Court decisions have
established that the State has the right to impose reasonable and nondiscriminatory taxes for use of its highways by vehicles engaged in both intrastate
and interstate commerce. The amount of the charges and the method of
collection are primarily for determination by the State itself, and so long as
they are reasonable and are fixed according to some uniform, fair, and
practical standard related to use, they constitute no burden on interstate
commerce." S. Doc. No. 81, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1944).
In discussing solutions of the problem (Part IV), however, the report concluded that, "Court action seems to offer no adequate measure of relief for unreasonable licensing and tax restrictions on interstate commerce." Id. at 73.
A staff report to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House
of Representatives, 84th Congress, 1st Session (1955), dealing with state
taxation and interstate trucking and the reciprocity problem (not published
as a committee report) merely parrotted the comment of the 1944 report as
to states' rights and omitted the important earlier conclusion as to the inadequacy of court action for relieving unreasonable tax restrictions on interstate
commerce. Also ignored in the 1955 report is the subhead to Part III of the
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How, then, can the uninterrupted interstate movement of motor
vehicles be facilitated and state highway revenues be adequately protected? The problem inheres in the very nature of our federal system
with its unique organization of at least 49 sovereignties and the
equally unique relationships among them. There are only two avenues
open for its solution. All of the sovereigns may engage in a cooperative
venture to agree upon and achieve a desired result or one sovereign,
the United States, may be able to persuade, direct or compel all the
others toward accepting an appropriate solution. In terms of our
political system, this means: (1) cooperative, joint action between or
among states or, (2) congressional consideration and treatment of
the problem.
A significant and interesting example of cooperative state action is
the western system of proportional registration or proration.22 This
system contemplates the registration of an entire fleet of commercial
vehicles in any one state for the payment of a fee proportional to
mileage traveled by the fleet in that state and other states. The system
has been operative in nine western states2 since January, 1956, under
a regional compact, known as the Vehicle Registration Proration and
Reciprocity Agreement, which is unique among reciprocity documents. 24 Whereas the customary "agreements" have been mere statements of understanding, the proration agreement is a formal contract.
The parties to it are described as "contracting states," the signatories
certify that they are "officials lawfully authorized to execute this
agreement" and they "mutually agree." They have prescribed terms,
conditions and procedures for the registration of commercial vehicle
fleets on a proportional basis in the member states. To the extent
that there has been valid legislative authorization to enter into such
a contract, the western proration agreement is a valid and binding
interstate compact.2
One of the first questions raised in regard to this agreement was
whether such a compact can be valid without the consent of the
United States Congress, since the United States Constitution provides
that no state shall enter into any agreement or compact with another
1944 booklet (p. 66). Part III is entitled, "Legal and Practical Aspects to
Trade Barriers" and is subtitled, "Intelligent federal-state cooperation is the
key to solution of the complex problems involved."
22. WESTERN HIGHWAY INSTITUTE, PROPORTIONAL REGISTRATION-THE

WESTERN
SYSTEM FOR LICENSING INTERSTATE MOTOR VEHICLE FLEETS-A BRIEF HISTORY
AND EXPLANATION (1958).

23. California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oregon and Washington.
24. The developments which led to adoption of the Western system have
been described in Mason, Interstate Taxation of Commercial Vehicles in the
West, COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE GOVERNMENT, (1956), and Davis,

Developments in the Western States Relating to Reciprocity Agreements, presented to session on economics, finance, and administration, 35th annual meeting, Highway Research Board, Washington, D. C., January 18, 1956.
25. See note 22 supra,App. B.
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state without the consent of Congress.2
The so-called "compact
clause" would, on first reading, seem to indicate that all interstate
agreements must have the consent of Congress. While this seems to
have been the early view,2 7 there is no question but that it is an incor28
rect interpretation today.
In its latest consideration of the subject, the U. S. Supreme Court
affirmed 29 an Illinois decision in which the Illinois court had said:
A consideration of the authorities demonstrates that "agreements," such
as those giving effect to reciprocity provisions in automobile licensing
cases, are not at all the sort of "compacts" nullified by the federal Constitution. In Dixie Wholesale Grocery v. Martin, 278 Ky. 705, 129 S.W.2d
181, 183, it was held that a reciprocal agreement between Ohio and
Kentucky for the exchange of data contained in sales tax reports was
not a prohibited "compact between the states." "There are many matters
upon which different states may agree that can in no respect concern the
United States." Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503. In the latter case,
the court said, 148 U.S. at 519, "Looking at the clause in which the
terms 'compact' or 'agreement' appear, it is evident that the prohibition
is directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of
political power in the states, which may encroach upon or interfere with
the just supremacy of the United States."
Consideration of these and other pertinent authorities impels the conclusion that the Federal constitutional interdiction of "interstate compacts" was written into the organic law of the land in order to protect
a then nascent republic from such ententes among powerful States as
would aggrandize their political power at the expense of the compromise
of national sovereignty. The provision does not inhibit those purely
fiscal interstate agreements that facilitate interstate commerce and aid
in execution of internal revenue policies. This is particularly true when
such agreements conduce to, rather than restrain, commerce among the
30
several States.
This statement is not only a complete confirmation of the views expressed by leading students on the subject,3 ' it is also rather firm
authority that the nine-state Vehicle Registration Proration and
Reciprocity Agreement does not violate the compact clause and that
32
the consent of Congress is not required.
26. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.

27.
28.
29.
30.

Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
Zn

MAENmw & WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE

Bode v. Barrett, 344 U.S. 583 (1953).
Bode v. Barrett, 412 Ill. 204, 106 N.E.2d 521, 535 (1952).

1925 (1951).

31. Cf. note 27 supra; Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the
Constitution-A Study in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925).

32. Zimmerman & Wendell indicate that agreements between states of the
Union and foreign states or provinces are legally supportable in the same
manner as above, although some additional considerations are involved.
Op. cit. supra note 28, chap. V.

[Author's note: It has also been suggested that ratification by legislatures of the party states is requisite to a binding agreement. Where
statutory delegation of authority has been given prior to execution of
a compact, however, it would seem that the action of officials designated
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The states that entered into the agreement did so following careful
consideration and preliminary examination of the problems involved
at both legislative and administrative levels and adopted a pattern of
legislation which not only broadened the authority to make reciprocity
agreements but also, in the majority of instances, provided for a
33
statutory means for proportional registration on a unilateral basis.
The western apportionment system applies only to fleet operations.
A "fleet" is three or more commercial vehicles, two of which are
tractors or power units and all of which travel in more than one
state.34 Non-fleet vehicles are accorded full reciprocity. 35 Only interstate line-haul vehicles are subject to apportionment. Vehicles used
entirely within a single state, such as local pickup and delivery rigs
are licensed fully in that state.
An annual proration application is accomplished in five steps, as
follows:
(1) For the first step (schedule "A"), the operator lists each fleet
vehicle and the information required for registering that vehicle
in each of the states to which the application is to be submitted.
is sufficient to consummate a binding agreement. (Atlantic & Danville
Ry. v. Hooker, 194 Va. 496, 74 S.E.2d 270 (1953) 1.
33. The following is a chart of the statutes:
WESTERN PRORATION STATUTES
Officers

Reciprocity

Proportiona
Registration

Agreements

California

vehicle Code
139.75 et seq.

vehicle Code
215, 217.

Vehicle Code
219.

Vehicle Code
218.

Colorado

CRS (1953)
13-2-1, 2.

CRS (1953)
13-5-1(2),
(3); 13-5-17.

Bv virtue of
Western
Compact.

Construction
of reciprocity
statutes.

Idaho

IC 49-144,
145.

IC 49-120.

IC 49-146 (c).

IC 49-146 (b)

Kansas

KGS Supp.
1955,

KGS Supp.
1955, 74-4302.

Montana

RCM 53-129
(2) (a).

KGS Supp.
KGS Supp.
8-4481.1955.
-1.
195 8-149a
(b).
RCM 53-129
RCM 53-625.
(1).

Policy
Declaration
Vehicle Code
219 (h).

IC 49-144.

RCM 53-129
(3).

Nevada

NRS 482. 395.

NRS 482. 390.

NRS 706. 810.

N-US 706. 780.

NRS 706. 750.

New Mexico

NMSA (1953)
64-12-1.

NMSA (1953)
64-6-1.

NMSA (1953)
64-3-3 (2)
(c).

NMSA (1953)
64-12-3.

NMSA (1953)
64-12-2.

Oregon

ORS 481. 162.

ORS 481. 155.

ORS 481. 160.

ORS 481. 162
(2).

Washington

RCW 46. 84.
050.

RCW 46.
16.030.

RCW 46. 84.
020.

RCW 46. 84.
060.

RCW 46. 84.
010.

34. Vehicle Registration Proration and Reciprocity Agreement. See note 22

supra § 16.

35. WESTERN HIGHWAY INSTITUTE, PROPORTIONATE REGISTRAToN-THE WESTERN SYSTEM FOR LICENSING INTERSTATE MOTOR VEHICLE FLEETS-A BRIEF HISTORY
(1958) App. B, Vehicle Registration Proration and Reciprocity Agreement § 70.
36. Schedules referred to are part of the uniform application form used in
AND EXPLANATION

proportional registration, reproduced in the work cited in note 22 supra.
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The purpose of this listing is to identify the vehicles which
are to be licensed for the coming year and to give the administrators the information from which fee computations can be
made. This is similar to the information required for registration of vehicles in any particular state.
The second step (schedule "B") is a computation, for each of
the states, of fees which would be due if all of the vehicles were
to be licensed in any one of them.
On schedule "B," the operator reports the total number of miles
operated in each of the states to which an apportionment application is to be submitted. These miles will be computed for the
vehicles operated in the fleet during the twelve-month period
ending on August 31 prior to the registration year for which
application is made.37 The total number of miles run by these
same vehicles in all states is also reported. Then, for each state,
the operator computes the percentage of total miles which were
operated by his fleet in that state during the previous year.
By this step, the prorate fraction-the percentage of total fleet
miles operated in each of the states during the previous yearis determined.
The percentage developed in step three is then applied for each
state to the total dollar figure computed in step two. (schedule
"B") For instance, if the application shows that 10% of the
miles for a particular fleet were traveled in California during
1956, and it would take $100,000 to license every vehicle in the
fleet in California for 1957, the operator will pay California
$10,000. In this way, each state receives the amount of money
due under its own laws for that percentage of the vehicles
which, if operated entirely in that state without leaving it,
would be sufficient to carry on the operation in question.
The final step (schedule "C") is designating for each vehicle,
specifically, the state in which it is "most frequently dispatched,
garaged, serviced, maintained, operated or otherwise controlled." 38 "Base" license plates, i. e., license plates of the states
in which the vehicles are "based" according to the above definition, are then issued for each fleet vehicle.39 Since the physical
operating characteristics control, a fleet operator may have all
of his vehicles based in a single state, or he may have vehicles
40
in some of them but not all or he may have some in each state.

37. Op. cit. supra note 35, § 50.

38. Id. § 14.
39. Subject to administrative review. Ibid.
40. "Basing" for the purpose of securing license plates does not affect revenue payment to the states.
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With the application (a copy is filed with each prorate state in which
the fleet operates) the operator pays each state the apportioned
amount due to it. Each vehicle listed in the fleet is then considered
to have met all of the registration requirements of that state and is
free to travel in that state in the same manner as other vehicles fully
41
licensed there.
How do the enforcement officials know whether a vehicle has complied with the requirements of proration? Under the western compact, the state in which a vehicle is based issues a full registration
plate for that vehicle so that each fleet vehicle will have a basic registration plate of some state. In addition, a special proration plate is
issued for each vehicle. Spaces are provided on this plate for affixing
a special identification for each of the states to which that vehicle has
been apportioned. If the vehicle has a Washington base plate and a
prorate plate with Oregon, Idaho and California stickers, it will be
visually recognized in those states as being fully licensed in each of
them. The stickers are numbered and assigned, by this number, to
particular fleet vehicles. They are neither interchangeable nor transferable.
If, during the course of a license year, vehicles are added to a fleet,
a supplemental application is filed, one copy to each state in which the
fleet operates. The information for added vehicles is the same as for
an original application except that the proration percentage established in the original is used for all supplementals during that license
year.
Apportionment enables the states to avoid the difficulties encountered under ordinary reciprocal exemption agreements. Non-residents
do not escape responsibility. Fleet operators who use vehicles in the
state make a tax contribution regardless of domicile or residence. It
is, however, unnecessary for the states to be involved in the determination of very difficult legal questions concerning residence and
domicile. Businesses are frequently incorporated in a particular state
for tax reasons, but under apportionment arbitrary selection of residence for business purposes ceases to be a means by which tax liability
can be avoided insofar as vehicle licensing is concerned.
States which are sparsely populated and which are, therefore, unlikely to be the center or home location of interstate businesses but
which, nevertheless, are frequently traversed by interstate vehicles
are enabled, by apportionment, to derive a fair share of appropriate
annual charges from interstate vehicles.
Apportionment of annual charges places interstate vehicles and
those which remain entirely within the state on a basis of absolute
parity with respect to such charges. If the interstate vehicle is
41. Op. cit. supra note 35, § 54.
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entitled to exemption, the vehicles entirely within the state may be
subject to discrimination. If the interstate vehicle is required to pay
the full annual charge, it, in turn, will be subjected to discriminatory
treatment. For both inter and intrastate carriers, apportionment removes any element of unfair discrimination. This elimination of discrimination is important to the states because, as noted above, there
has been growing concern with the possibility of federal intervention
at either congressional or judicial levels under the commerce clause
of the United States Constitution. If discrimination is absent, one of
the chief reasons for intervention is absent.
Additionally, apportionment encourages interstate movement because it results in the equivalent of license reciprocity for commercial
vehicles while at the same time affording equitable distribution of
annual charges among the states on the realistic basis of actual
physical presence of vehicles.
The principles for interstate vehicle licensing embodied in the
Vehicle Registration Proration and Reciprocity Agreement are
strikingly similar to the rules evolved under United States Supreme
Court decisions relative to ad valorem taxation of carrier property
such as railroad rolling stock, ships and planes. A brief historical
review of the pertinent cases may serve to indicate how the Court,
over a period of some years has encountered and sought to avoid, as
the western plan seeks to avoid, the improper and unfair consequences
of the home-port theory and the rule of mobilia personam sequuntur
both for taxing jurisdictions and taxpayers,
The earliest carrier property tax cases dealt with ships. In 1854,
the case of Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 42 presented to the
United States Supreme Court the question of the right of the city of
San Francisco to make an unapportioned assessment against ships
whose home port and port of documentation were New York and
whose owner was also domiciled in New York. The Court held the
San Francisco tax invalid, basing the decision largely on the fact that
San Francisco was not the home port of the craft. A similar basis was
used to strike down an unapportioned tax levied by the city of
Mobile against ships having a home port in New York and whose
owner resided in New York. Two other cases, St. Louis v. The Ferry
Co., and Transportation Co. v. Wheeling," gave further indication
that the home port of a fleet of ships was a primary consideration in
determining the situs of the fleet for tax purposes. This conclusion
was not surprising in view of the importance attached to the home
port in various phases of admiralty law but it should be noted that in
42. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 576 (1854).
43. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423 (1870).
44. 99 U.S. 273 (1878).
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all these early cases the home port of the craft was also the state of
domicile of the owner.
The early significance of the home port as a tax situs for ships was
destroyed when the Supreme Court established the now generally
accepted rule that permits a non-domiciliary state to tax watercraft
which have acquired an actual situs there by being operated wholly
and continuously within the state. The rule was established in 1905
in Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia4 5 which upheld the right
of the State of Virginia to make unapportioned assessment against
ships engaged in interstate commerce continuously and entirely in
Virginia although the owner's domicile was Delaware and the ships
were not registered in Virginia. The rule was also mentioned by the
Supreme Court one year later when it held invalid an assessment by
the state of Kentucky against ships and barges owned by an Illinois
corporation and having a home port in Paducah, Kentucky. In the
latter case, Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky,4 the Court held that
the mere fact that the vessels' home port was Kentucky was insufficient justification for taxation by that state since the owner's domicile
was in another state and the craft had not acquired a permanent situs
in Kentucky under the Old Dominion Steamship Company case. The
two cases outlined above seemed to establish the rule that the state
of the owner's domicile had the sole jurisdiction to tax watercraft in
interstate commerce unless the ships established an actual situs in
some other state.
The latter principle was further fortified by the decision of Southern
Pacific Company v. Kentucky.47 The Supreme Court there held that
ocean going ships of a Kentucky corporation could be taxed at their
full value by Kentucky even though the vessels had never been near
that state. Following the Southern Pacific Case, the principle that
only the domiciliary state could tax ships operating in interstate commerce unless an actual situs had been established elsewhere was
accepted by state taxing authorities and the Supreme Court was not
called upon to consider any problems in this area until 1949. The
taxation of other instrumentalities of commerce was the subject of
litigation throughout this period and cases involving railroad rolling
stock and commercial airplanes evolved the doctrine of apportionment
of value to various states in which the property operated.
A long line of cases in the Supreme Court established the doctrine
that railroad rolling stock could be taxed by a reasonable apportionment formula and that the state of the owner's domicile could not
apply an unapportioned tax to the value of cars located permanently
in other states. The doctrine was established by the U. S. Supreme
45. 198 U.S. 299 (1905).
46. 202 U.S. 409 (1906).

47. 222 U.S. 63 (1911).
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Court in 18914 when a non-domiciliary state was permitted to tax
an interstate carrier by taking as the basis of assessment such proportion of its capital stock as the number of miles of railroad over which
its cars ran within the state boundaries to the total number of miles
in all the states. If a taxpayer was unable to show that any specific
cars or any average number of cars were located permanently outside
the state of domicile throughout the tax year, however, the domiciliary
state could then tax all of the cars of the railroad as was done in
New York Cent. R.R. v. Miller.49 The Court later, in 1944, approved a
similar unapportioned tax by the state of Minnesota upon commercial
airplanes owned by a Minnesota corporation and operated in several
surrounding states. In that case, Northwest Airlines, Inc., v. Minnesota5o about which more will be said later-the Court noted that the
taxpayer had not shown that any specific planes or any average
number had been permanently outside Minnesota throughout the
year.
The apportionment method of taxation applied to other instrumentalities of commerce was finally applied to watercraft and the validity
of this method of taxation of ships was first considered by the United
States Supreme Court in Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co.,51
in 1949. Louisiana and the city of New Orleans assessed boats belonging to a Delaware corporation operating on the Mississippi and Ohio
Rivers on irregular schedules. The assessment was based on the ratio
between the total number of miles of the company's lines in Louisiana
and the total number of miles of the entire line. In upholding the
assessment, the Supreme Court held that the state of domicile of the
owner of the vessels did not have the exclusive jurisdiction to tax and
that the apportionment theory applied to rolling stock did not violate
any constitutional provisions when applied to river boats operating in
interstate commerce. The Mississippi Valley Barge Line case did not
define the limits of the domiciliary state's authority to tax watercraft
and it remained for the State of Ohio to present that question to the
Court in Standard Oil Co. v. Peck,52 in 1952. In effect, the Court held
that it was a necessary corollary to the Barge Line case that the domiciliary state did not have the exclusive taxing jurisdiction when it
could be shown that the property had acquired a tax situs in another
state, thereby permitting an assessment in another state on an apportionment basis.
The Northwest Airlines case is as notable for the number of different opinions given in that 5 to 4 decision (3 concurring opinions, and
48. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
49.
50.
51.
52.

202
322
336
342

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

584
292
169
382

(1906).
(1944).
(1949).
(1952).
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1 dissenting opinion) as it is for the principle of law announced by the
decision of the Court. The late Justice Jackson, in concurring, indicated that the "home port" theory appealed to him strongly on the
basis of the factual record in the case. However, he made a statement
which is both interesting and important in the present context.
The evils of local taxation of goods or vehicles in transit are not measured by the exaction of one locality alone, but by the aggregation of
them. I certainly do not favor exemption of interstate commerce from
its "just share of taxation." But history shows that fair judgment as to
what exactions are just to the passer-by cannot be left to local opinion.
When local authority is taxing its own, the taxed ones may be assumed
to be able to protect themselves at the polls. No such sanction enforces
fair dealing to the transient. In all ages and climes those who are settled
in strategic localities have made the moving world pay dearly. This the
commerce clause was designed to end in the United States.53
The dissenting opinion by Chief Justice Stone also contained a very
fundamental statement which, in the light of recent developments,
may well be the view of the present majority:
This Court has never denied the power of the several states to impose
a property tax on vehicles used in interstate transportation in the taxing
state. It has recognized, as we have seen, that such instruments of interstate transportation, at least if moving over fixed routes on regular
schedules, may thus acquire a tax situs in every state through which
they pass. And it has met the problem of burdensome multiple taxation
by the several states through which such vehicles pass by recognizing
that the due process clause or the commerce clause or both preclude each
state from imposing on the interstate commerce involved an undue or
inequitable share of the tax burden. In Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v.
Browning, 310 U.S. 362, 365, we recently considered "the guiding principles for adjustment of the state's right to secure its revenues and the
nation's duty to protect interstate transportation." We declared that
"The problem to be solved is what portion of an interstate organism may
appropriately be attributed to each of the various states in which it functions." And, in sustaining the tax, apportioned according to mileage, upon
the entire property, including rolling stock, of an interstate railroad, imposed by Tennessee, the state of the owner's domicile, in which its principal business office and over 70% of its trackage was located, we said
that the state could not "use a fiscal formula .

.

. to project the taxing

power of the state plainly beyond its borders."
This Court has accordingly held invalid state taxation of vehicles of
interstate transportation unless the tax is equitably apportioned to the
use of the vehicles within the state compared to their use without, whether
the tax is laid by the state of the domicile or another. Such an apportionment has been sustained when made according to the mileage traveled
within and without the state, Pullman's Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, . . . or

the average number of vehicles within the taxing state during the tax
period. Marye v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., supra; American Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Hall, supra, 82; Union Transit Co. v. Lynch, supra.
53. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 307 (1944).
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But if the tax is laid without apportionment or if the apportionment,
when made, is plainly inequitable so as to bear unfairly on the commerce
by compelling the carrier to pay to the taxing state more than its fair
share of the tax measured by the full value of the property, this Court
has set aside the tax as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, whether it be in form on the rolling stock, Union Transit Co. v.
Kentucky, supra; Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, supra; Johnson Oil Co.
v. Oklahoma, supra, or on the carrier's entire property, Fargo v. Hart,
193 U.S. 490; or on a franchise or right to do business, Allen v. Pullman's
Car Co., 191 U.S. 171; Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66; Southern Ry. Co. v.
Kentucky, 274 U.S. 76; cf. Norfolk & Western R. v. Pennsylvania, 136
U.S. 114.54
The tenor of the dissent was that the Minnesota tax was invalid as
it did not provide for apportionment and thus exposed the interstate
carrier to the risk of a multiple tax burden.
The concurring opinion of Justice Black in the Northwest Airlines
case indicated that he thought Congress, having the power to regulate
commerce among the states, should do so and that, in the absence of
Congressional action, the state taxing power should be upheld. 55
A more recent case dealing with this difficult subject was, significantly enough, not a property tax case at all, but a matter involving a
license tax on trucks imposed by the city of Chicago and applied by
that city to interstate carriers.5 Justice Frankfurter wrote the decision which held that the local ordinance did not run afoul of the interstate commerce clause because of lack of apportionment and, referring
to his own language in the Northwest Airlines case, Justice Frankfurter said:
the benefits given to Northwest by Minnesota and for which Minnesota
taxes-its corporate facilities and the governmental resources which
Northwest enjoys in the conduct of its business in Minnesota-are concretely symbolized by the fact that Northwest's principal place of business
is in St. Paul.... The relation between Northwest and Minnesota-a relation existing between no other State and Northwest-and the benefits
which this relation affords are the constitutional foundation for the taxing
power which Minnesota has asserted." 322 U.S. at 294. And the two
concurring opinions in the Northwest Airlines case harmonize with the
result we reach here. Indeed, the 'home port' theory favored by Mr.
Justice Jackson, 322 U.S. at 306, fits a fleet of trucks at least as well as it
does a fleet of airliners.
The central and decisive fact in this case is that respondent's business
has, as much as any transportation business can have, a home. That home
is Chicago. To the extent the respondent's business is not confired within
the City's limits, it revolves around the City. It is fed by terminals for
54. Id. at 313.
55. The author of the majority opinion in Northwest Airlines was unwilling
to accept this reasoning. His strong dissent in Capitol Greyhound Lines v.
Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950), indicates that this divergence of views had not
been reconciled up to that time.
56. Chicago v. Willett Co., 344 U.S. 574 (1953).
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It receives, much

more continuously than did the airline in the Northwest Airlines case or
the railroad in the Miller case, the City's protection, and it benefits from

the City's public services. In the circumstances, a tax of reasonable proportions such as the one in question, not shown in fact to be a burden on

interstate commerce, is not inconsistent with the Commerce Clause. 57
With the decision in Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board
58
of Equalization,
the wheel has come the full turn, at least for airplanes. The U. S. Supreme Court there upheld an apportioned tax on
airline property used in interstate commerce. The carrier, a Delaware
corporation with principal place of business in Oklahoma, had argued
that the tax was precluded under the Northwest Airline case unless
the Court saw fit to overrule that decision. The Court answered that
the facts of the Northwest Airlines case showed no taxable situs of
the carrier's property in any other state. It also indicated that if there
is taxable situs in states other than the owner's domicile, as in the
Barge Line case, the state of the owner's domicile cannot tax all of the
property, and the Court further indicated that Standard Oil Co. v.
Peck, supra, is exactly in line with this rule.
Chicago v. Willett involved an excise tax but it is significant to note
the parallel which the Court finds between that matter and the rationale of the property tax cases.59 It makes clear once again that if only
one possible tax situs is established with no showing of exposure to
other tax jurisdictions the mere fact that interstate commerce is being
done will not insulate against liability. The Court looks with disfavor
on exemption of interstate commerce from state taxes where no undue
burden is shown.
Conversely, the Court will not uphold state taxes which may result
in duplicate taxation of property. 60 And it will uphold state property
tax laws which relieve interstate commerce of exposure to duplicate
taxation by the apportionment method. 61 The net effect of the decisions is to permit the taxing jurisdiction to disregard domicile or
residence of the owner and, instead, to regard the actual physical
presence of carrier property as a significant criterion in determining
liability. This, of course, is exactly what the western proration system accomplishes with respect to interstate vehicle licensing.
It will be seen that the proportional registration system for vehicle
licensing applies the composite rationale of the four cases; Northwest
57. Id. at 579. (Emphasis added.)
58. 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
59. In the Braniff case, ibid., the author of the majority opinion in Chicago
v. Willett Co. indicated that he would not vote to sustain a state tax applying
an apportionment formula in the absence of a uniform apportionment formula
applicable in all states.
60. See note 52 supra.
61. See note 58 supra.
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Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, Ott v. Mississippi
Valley Barge Line Company, and Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska
State Board of Equalization. Unfortunately, as we have seen through
the consideration of the motor carrier cases, 62 the Court considers it
to be beyond its power to evolve similar rules in the licensing field.
An agreement of ten southeastern states, recently expanded to
include fourteen states,6 3 has also dealt with the interstate commercial
vehicle problem by providing for distributing licenses among the
states which are parties to the agreement. Domicile of the owner is
disregarded in determining the situs of vehicles for licensing purposes. Instead, it is recognized that a single business may have one
or more business siti and vehicles are assigned, for licensing, to such
siti on the basis of being principally garaged, dispatched, maintained,
controlled, etc. there. The chief differences between this plan and the
western system are:
(1) Western apportionment is accomplished by mathematical formula in an application to all states in which a fleet is operated.
Southeastern apportionment is accomplished by licensing of
vehicles by the carrier at various principal places of business
in those states.
(2) The southeastern multiple situs licensing does not meet the
64
bridge-state problem as directly as the western system.
(3) The western agreement is a formal contract by which a system
of vehicle registration is established. The southeastern agreement is a written statement of understanding of the terms and
conditions under which license reciprocity will be extended.
There can be no question but that the two regional licensing agreements discussed indicate that cooperative action by the states can be
effective. The question remains, however, whether effective solutions
can be reached through state channels before the federal "active
partner" becomes impatient enough to spur the states "toward greater
65
uniformity ... and the settlement of interstate difficulties .... ,
The means by which Congress might intervene and the extent to
which such intercession might be entertained have been the subject
62. See note 17 supra.
63. The agreement covering the operation of interstate motor vehicles is

reprinted in BULLETIN

ADVISORY

SERVICE, RECIPnocITY BETWEEN STATES,

p. C

(American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc.). The states involved are: Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and West Virginia.
64. The problem of sparsely settled states in which very few vehicle owners
have established places of business, yet which experience considerable vehicle
traffic, while not peculiar to the West, does not seem to be as acute among the
"14 State" group.
65. See note 2 supra.
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of some speculation.S6 There would seem to be four general categories
under which such action might be taken:
(1) Congressional delineation of conditions under which state tax
laws might apply to interstate vehicles.
(2) Creation of federal interstate transportation corporations protected from multiple state taxation by proscription of federal
statute or federal charter.
(3) Federal assistance to states might be made conditional upon
conformance to prescribed interstate tax formulae.
(4) The Congress itself might initiate the negotiation of a single
67
interstate compact which would be subject to its approval.
In the 1944 study of the Board of Investigation of Research 68 the
Congress was told that even though it had the power to control with
respect to vehicles moving in interstate commerce "... . the legal and
practical limitations on this power lead irresistibly to the conclusion
that the solution to this complex problem lies in a method of intelligent Federal-State cooperation." This statement is even more persuasive today insofar as interstate vehicle licensing is concerned than
when it was first written.
Time and tremendous growth have made the problem larger and
more complex, as we noted at the start of this article. The states
have been searching for a solution zimong themselves and have made
notable progress. The western proration system would seem to offer
a desirable format since it prevents license duplication, insures interstate license revenues to all states in which such interstate vehicles
operate and obviates any preoccupation with questions of residence
and domicile, which are most difficult in this field. The fact remains,
however, that the problem is a national one. Efforts such as those in
the South and West are required for other sections of the country.
The states can deal adequately with the problem, but it will require
hard persistent and sustained effort by both state governments and
affected industries. The process will not be automatic and, should
the states falter, the assistance of their (since 1956) "active partner"
can be anticipated.
66. See note 7 supra.
67. Braden, Cutting the GordianKnot of Interstate Taxation, 18 O-fo ST. L.J.
57 (1957); Hartman, op. cit. supra note 11, at 253, 284; Rosenberg, Interstate
Commerce: To What Extent May Congress Define the Areas of State and Local
Taxation?, report, Comm. on State and Local Taxes, American Bar Ass'n
(1956).
68. S.Doc. No. 81, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1944).

